Modeling Bounded Rationality at the World Bank
By Sagar Rijal
Although Washington D.C. is the center for applied public
policy, every so often there is a lecture on pure economic theory for which the
practical application is not even confirmed. Such was the case of Dr. Ariel
Rubinstein’s lecture on “Directions in Modeling Bounded Rationality” at the
World Bank on Thursday March 28. Dr. Kausaik Basu the Chief Economist of
development economics group at the Bank, introduced Dr. Rubinstein as the
foremost theoretician of game theory and advanced formal research on “bounded
rationality” in the last twenty years. Dr. Rubenstein did nothing to diminish
his reputation. His presentation was quite esoteric, formal and not exactly
geared to a layperson. Dr. Basu’s claim that the work would influence policy
and debate on the field regarding the use of behavioral economics and
meaningful rationality did not seem to bear out. Instead, the takeaway might
have been the deeper questions regarding the value of basic theoretical
research and its application to public policy problems. All we can say is that
what is rationality and how agents use rationality in their actions is
contingent upon the rules of the game.
Dr. Rubinstein presented his recent paper that he
co-authored with Dr. Jacob Glazer, his colleague at Tel Aviv University,
Israel. The premise of the highly technical and formal paper is that the
rationality principle that undergirds much of economic theory is highly
contingent so that agents who are knowledgeable or astute can play the game by
learning how to change their true choices based on the rules of the game. The
game as presented is a persuasion or selection situation, a variation of the
leader-follower game, which the authors call the listener-speaker game. In this
game the listener presents her profile of information to which the speaker
offers a matrix of conditions with which to judge the listener’s profile. Upon
listening to the conditions the listener has to respond. The implication of the
model is that “boundedly rational” agents might respond to the speaker’s
conditions by telling the truth or lying.
What is the “practical implication” of Dr. Rubinstein
research presentation? After presenting his model and the implications of the
model, even the author was non-committal of the practical implication of this
or any other theoretical model. He insisted that as an economic theorist who
tries to replicate a slice of reality into his highly stylized models, he is
way of making grand pronouncements or sweeping conclusions. As a way of
example, Dr. Rubinstein jokingly warned that no one should ask a game theorist
if Israel should attack Iran. For game theorists who work in IR, such questions
might be the ultimate application.
Because the forum for the lecture was the World Bank and not
an academic conference, the question of application was paramount. How do pure
theoretical research benefit the policy and practice of economics, especially
developmental economics? Again Dr. Rubenstein was dismissive of such concerns
suggesting that these are highly formalized models, which approximate reality
but cannot replicate it. As such these models would be meaningless or
contradictory if the “rules or procedures” of the game is tweaked to fit a
different context. Yet, in his closing remarks, Dr. Basu, being the chief
economist of the Bank, tried to defend formal models and their application to
practical questions and suggested it was up to the researchers working in
practical projects to find useful applications of formal model, such as the one
presented by Dr. Rubinstein.
~Sagar Rijal, ABD, is
spending the final semester of his graduate assistantship doing research
for his dissertation in Washington, D.C. Every week he will attend
meetings, seminars, or presentations at think tanks and develop a column
for the Bulletin community.
He can be reached at
srijal@odu.edu