Central Asia After U.S. Leaves

By Sagar Rijal

Given the planned drawdown of American forces from Afghanistan in 2014, the issues relating to Afghanistan’s future, political instability, and the role of the Taliban are of pressing urgency. But the Afghan problem tends to overshadow the fallout in Central Asia. To address that question, Center for Strategic & International Studies has published a policy report titled “The United States and Central Asia after 2014” written by the Center Fellow Dr. Jeffrey Mankoff. On February 4, a public meeting was held where Dr. Mankoff presented the major findings of his report.

Compiled after extensive fieldwork and interviews with local stakeholders, Dr. Mankoff’s report offered a complex picture of American dealings with each of the states of Central Asia in the decade since 9/11 and the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan. Seeking cheap and safe supply routes as alternatives to the treacherous path through Pakistan, the U.S. sought out airspace, logistical transit points and military cooperation in the five “Stans” of Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Riven with their internal political troubles and post-Soviet economic malaise these states were eager to cash in on the bounty of the U.S. and ISAF dollars. At the same time, these five states were in sensitive strategic situation because their bilateral relations were often contentious and each of them felt the constant tug of reprimand from Moscow, which was growing increasingly suspicious of larger American designs in its backyard. One astonishing data point leapt out: four of the five Central Asian states that allowed land supply and transit routes for ISAF forces into Afghanistan, each have received payment of more than $500 million per year since the war started. Cooperation was bought at a high price.

After 2014 when the US and NATO forces leave, the effect of the lost economic activity and monetary transfusion might be catastrophic. Dr. Mankoff highlighted the complex regional rivalries among these states based on historical squabbles, political and economic competition and strategic considerations. Their internal challenges of poverty as well as political upheavals might lead to instability. Furthermore, strategic and economic interests would surely compel Russia’s footprint to be magnified, which may not be accepted politely by the Chinese who have made massive economic and infrastructure investments there in the last decade. Given these possible dynamics in this volatile region, the question of American strategic interests and long-term plans for the region is imperative.

Just what the U.S. can or should do produced heated debate in the panel but little clarity. Dr. Mankoff recommended deep, strategic and all-spectrum engagement so that the region does not veer into chaos. Some limited variation of such a plan seems to be official American policy as well: to try create a “New Silk Road” of trade and commerce. But the discussants and the audience were wary of a deep and long American commitment due not just to budgetary concerns but also concerns about the possible response from Russia and China of sustained U.S. presence in Central Asia. What course the U.S. ends up taking, of course, only time will tell.    

~Sagar Rijal, ABD, is spending the final semester of his graduate assistantship doing research for his dissertation in Washington, D.C. Every week he will attend meetings, seminars, or presentations at think tanks and develop a column for the Bulletin community.